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Abstract 
 
This paper aims to assess whether firms’ strategies of R&D outsourcing determine changes 
in their internal R&D employment intensity. Four strategic decisions are investigated: to 
start, increase, decrease or stop outsourcing. It is found that internal R&D employment 
intensity decreases when firms decide to start or to increase R&D outsourcing. However, 
this finding hides important differences according to the type and location of the contractor. 
Starting to outsource to research centers in the proper region seems to decrease internal 
R&D employment intensity, whereas the opposite is true in case of outsourcing to firms 
and universities outside the proper region.  
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1. Introduction 
Outsourcing activities spur a heated debate among economists and the public at large 
(Chesbrough, 2003; Howells et al., 2008). Not that buying goods and services from 
suppliers is something new, but because surging outsourcing (off shoring) is feared to 
displace domestic employment. Due to the rising educational level of the population in 
most developed countries, the outsourcing of low-skilled labor did not create alarmist 
tidings. But with the increasing division of labor at firm level, the availability of 
specialized knowledge outside the firm boundaries, the need to remain competitive through 
innovation, and the swift development of emerging economies like India and China, R&D 
outsourcing is believed potentially to affect high-skilled employees and to displace R&D 
jobs.  
This paper focuses on the impact of firm-level decisions to start, increase, decrease 
or stop R&D outsourcing, on the R&D employment intensity. This topic can be related to 
the important change in strategic R&D management in the 1990s towards an increasing 
intensification of companies’ dependence upon external sources of technology, including a 
trend towards more outsourcing (Coombs et al., 2003; Edler et al., 2002). Quinn and 
Hilmer (1995) attributed this tendency to the corporate strategies of firms to subcontract 
non-core or peripheral tasks. The higher reliance on external sources is considered part of a 
fundamental shift in the way companies generate new ideas and bring them to the market, 
as emphasized by the concept of ‘open innovation’ (Chesbrough, 2003). 
The empirical literature on R&D outsourcing showed a high interest in the 
determinants for R&D outsourcing (Mol, 2005), in the topic of competition between R&D 
outsourcing with the internal R&D activities stressing the question of complementarity 
versus substitution effects (Veugelers, 1997), and in the search for the ‘optimal’ level or 
balance between in-house and outsourced R&D (Belderbos et al., 2004). These analyses 
mainly considered budgets for R&D outsourcing. 
To our knowledge, empirical evidence on the effects of the outsourcing of R&D on 
the composition of skills in the total labor force of the firm, and more precisely the relative 
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importance of R&D workers (i.e. the internal R&D employment intensity) remains a blank 
spot in the literature. Studying this topic is in line with research investigating the impact of 
technological change on employment in terms of changes in the quality of employment. 
The literature on open innovation rightfully acknowledges that firms can never have all the 
expertise intra-muros (Chesbrough, 2003); but also acknowledges that for their core 
activities the best brains better work for the firm to be able to incorporate the external ideas 
into profitable innovation (Quinn, 2000; Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). These arguments 
draw attention to the effects of outsourcing on the labor composition at the firm level.  
This paper contributes to the empirical literature on R&D outsourcing in several 
ways. First, the topic is approached in a dynamic framework, using a panel of permanent 
R&D active firms. In contrast to extant empirical studies, the R&D budgets involved in 
outsourcing are complemented with the strategic decision of the firm to start, to increase, to 
decrease or to stop R&D outsourcing. Second, the effects of R&D outsourcing on the 
dynamics of internal R&D employment intensity (measured in terms of the evolution in the 
share of R&D employment in total employment at the firm level) are the central issue in 
this study. R&D employment, more than R&D budgets, is a vital element of the knowledge 
base of the firm and as such cannot be made redundant without careful consideration 
(Quinn, 2000). Third, R&D outsourcing is refined by taking the type and location of the 
contractor on board. The type of contractor varies between other (non-affiliated) firms, 
universities, and public and private research centers (von Hippel, 1988; Tether, 2002). 
Outsourcing to universities is likely to be more associated with basic research and the 
resulting path from invention to commercialization might be longer than in the case of 
applied research by suppliers directed towards troubleshooting. Consequently the choice of 
partner is not without relevance. Next, the location is taken into account because 
geographical proximity exerts an impact on the interaction possibilities (Teirlinck and 
Spithoven, 2008), because of the labor cost argument put forward in the off shoring 
literature (Sorenson et al., 2006; Cusmano et al., 2008), and because of cultural factors 
(Hofstede, 1991). A distinction can be made between outsourced R&D performed within 
the region, the country, and abroad (OECD, 2002).  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 pictures the theoretical background on 
R&D outsourcing and relates this to the internal R&D employment intensity. The main 
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drivers of R&D outsourcing are identified as well as the relation between outsourcing and 
the internal R&D employment intensity. Next, the importance of the type and the 
geographical location of contractors are discussed. From this literature review the main 
research questions are derived. Section 3 describes the nature of the dataset, the sample and 
the method used. Next, in section 4, the data analysis is carried out and the results are 
discussed. The concluding section focuses on the main findings, offers some implications 
for practitioners and policy, and identifies some limitations of the analysis. 
 
 
2. Theoretical background 
 
2.1 Firm motives for R&D outsourcing 
From a firm’s point of view, the decision whether to perform R&D activities internally or 
to outsource them can be approached from a cost perspective (Quinn, 2000) or from an 
external technology sourcing based view (in line with the ideas of distributed or open 
innovation, Chesbrough, 2003). 
From a cost perspective, firms have to weigh the costs of outsourcing a given 
activity against the cost of conducting it in-house. Williamson’s (1975) ideas on transaction 
costs include both the direct costs of the transaction and the possible opportunity costs of 
inferior governance decisions (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1994). With low uncertainty, 
reduced asset specificity and low frequency of iteration, firms will prefer a market 
transaction to internalising the activity (Williamson, 1985). However, as is often the case in 
R&D projects, transaction cost economics underline the risks of outsourcing activities 
based on specific assets or under conditions of uncertainty. 
From a technology sourcing based view a distinction can be made according to 
whether or not the outsourced activities belong to the core activities of the firm. On the one 
hand, outsourcing non-core activities allows firms to increase managerial attention and 
resource allocation to those tasks they do best (Gilley and Rasheed, 2000; Narula, 2001). 
On the other hand, R&D outsourcing of more core-related activities facilitates the access of 
fresh knowledge and new technology and helps benefitting from complementary 
capabilities. However, appropriation of the results of outsourced R&D is an important 
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element in this type of activity (Teece, 1986; Chesbrough, 2003). R&D aimed at the 
provision of enhanced information transfer and coordination across activities within the 
knowledge production system (implying second- and higher-order interactions among a set 
of value-chain activities) is confronted with more concerns of appropriation than R&D 
directly tied to the ability to identify, isolate, or solve a specific set of independent 
technical problems (Cassiman et al., 2005). The necessity of absorptive capacity suggesting 
that the impact of internal and external technology on firm performance is not independent 
supports this argument (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). 
Empirical evidence reveals that R&D outsourcing is driven by the lack of in-house 
R&D and technical expertise, followed by the reduction of development time and time to 
market (Howells et al., 2004, 2008). Reducing development costs ranked only in third 
place, followed with some distance by the reduction of risk (see also Mehta and Peters, 
2007) and uncertainty by sharing R&D with another (set of) partner(s). These drivers 
should be seen in conjunction with a greater codification of R&D processes (Granstrand et 
al., 1992; Narula, 2001). A main driver for R&D outsourcing includes the set-up of 
strategic research projects where partner firms or institutions possess complementary 
technological capabilities not available in-house (e.g. Pisano, 1990, Chesbrough, 2003). 
These empirical findings are not fully in line with the normative logic that 
technology outsourcing alliances allow the outsourcing firms to further specialize in their 
domain of core competence without being distracted by non-core activities (see e.g. 
Coombs, 1996). However, it does confirm the finding that ‘peripheral’ knowledge (i.e. 
specialized knowledge in the domain of outsourced activities) complements control in 
technology outsourcing alliances (Brusoni et al., 2001, Mehta and Peters, 2007, Tiwana and 
Keil, 2007).  
The potential downside of R&D outsourcing is that this kind of activities may 
induce an element of external technology dependence (Swan and Allred, 2003), enhance 
organizational cost (Jacobides and Billinger, 2006) and weaken the integration between 
production and R&D (Teece, 1986). Another concern is the possible deterioration of 
internal innovation capacity and loss of comparative advantage. Outsourcing R&D also 
means that other parties are provided with information about the firm and its products and 
 6 
reduces both the exclusivity of the resulting new knowledge and the ability of the firm to 
appropriate the results of its (outsourced) R&D (Arrow, 1962). 
According to Antras (2005), the transfer of new technology should usually be 
conducted internally, while that of technology between five and ten years old can be 
completed through outsourcing. This confirms earlier findings by Mansfield and Romeo 
(1980). Davidson and McFetridge (1984) find that the probability of outsourcing is lower 
the more radical the technology and the larger the R&D department of a firm. Other studies 
indicate that, in general, outsourcing is more frequent the more codifiable and less complex 
the technology is - with complexity being measured through the amount of R&D necessary 
to produce a good (Wilson, 1977; Kogut and Zander, 1993). Similarly, Trefler (2005) 
argues that outsourcing is the appropriate way for a sufficiently routine project that can be 
fully scoped or described, while projects difficult to describe from the outset should be 
conducted in-house. When the task outsourced is specific there are fewer risks involved, 
since contract design, enforcement and monitoring are relatively easy.  
Finally, it has to be recognized that the use of external sources is also influenced by 
more generic elements. A first element relates to the technological opportunities in a given 
industry (Klevorick et al., 1995). The openness of individual firms to external sources of 
knowledge is subject to a degree of firm-level decision, but many of these decisions are 
shaped by the search activities of other firms in their industry and by the nature of the 
environment in which they operate (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Nelson and Winter, 1982). 
Laursen and Salter (2006) found that the higher the technological opportunities offered by 
the industry in which firms are operating, the higher the degree of openness to external 
sources of innovation. A second element can be related to firm size. In this respect, and in 
support of Chesbrough (2003), Laursen and Salter (2006) found larger firms more likely to 
be open to external knowledge due to the higher availability of resources and innovations 
which are more complex in nature.  
 
2.2 The relation between R&D outsourcing and internal R&D employment intensity 
 
It is widely accepted that access to external technology, in combination with the presence 
of internal R&D necessary to absorb external knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) 
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allows firms to improve the performance of internal R&D efforts (Cassiman and Veugelers, 
2006). In addition, internal R&D enables firms to translate external knowledge into 
innovation opportunities and outsourced R&D facilitates spillovers from outside the 
network to the firm’s specific knowledge base (Audretsch et al., 1996). 
In line with these arguments, several empirical studies found a positive relationship 
between the share of external R&D in total R&D and productivity (Bönte, 2003; Beneito, 
2006; Griffith et al., 2004). Firms with high levels of absorptive capacity were found likely 
to be more open to external R&D because retaining skills and expert staff enables them to 
access wider networks (Rosenberg, 1990). Knowledge intensive small firms were less 
likely to be involved in this kind of activity because they often rely on the exploitation of 
new ideas and given the danger they face from leakage of their ideas, they limit the nature 
and scope of their external interaction (Laursen and Salter, 2006). 
 Evolutionary economics provides a different perspective on the effects of 
outsourcing knowledge-intensive or strategic activities, by stressing the impact of changing 
firm boundaries on the dynamic capabilities of the firm, and hence on its ability to 
integrate, build and reconfigure internal and external competencies to address changing 
environments (Teece et al., 1997). In this respect outsourcing is seen as part of a 
knowledge-searching strategy in which external actors contribute in the division of labour 
in research tasks and complement in-house R&D (Arrora and Gambardella, 1990; 
Chesbrough, 2003). 
 However, empirical evidence does not always support the idea of complementarity 
between internal and external R&D. Based on a cross-section of Dutch manufacturing 
firms, Audretsch et al. (1996) reported a substition effect of external R&D activity in low 
and medium technology industries (the reverse was true in high-tech industries). Cassiman 
and Veugelers (2006) found that firms combining internal and external R&D strategies for 
innovation show superior innovative performance. It also turns out that large, resourceful 
firms have a higher propensity to combine both strategies (Veugelers and Cassiman, 1999). 
Piga and Vivarelli (2004) modelled the decision to outsource R&D jointly with the decision 
on internal R&D and found that firms having larger internal R&D expenditures and 
pursuing broader objectives related to both process and product innovation have a greater 
propensity to engage in R&D outsourcing. 
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 In contrast with the interest in the topic of complementarity of - or substitution by - 
R&D outsourcing, to our knowledge, empirical evidence on the effects of the outsourcing 
of R&D on the composition of skills in the total labour force of the firm, and more 
precisely the relative importance of R&D (i.e. the internal R&D employment intensity) 
remains a blank spot in the literature. Studying this topic is in line with studies 
investigating the impact of technological change on employment in terms of changes in the 
quality of employment. Relying on evidence in this broader context, Segan and Sullivan 
(1997) and Kahn (2000) reveal that technological standardization - which drives the growth 
of outsourcing - reduces the importance of firm-specific knowledge, as standardization 
reduces the specificity of internal skills and induces convergence of firm-specific skills to 
general skills over time. Pianta (2004) studied – at macro level - the impact of 
technological innovation on the quality of jobs by looking at the relative importance of 
skilled and unskilled jobs and found the diffusion of technologies to have a strong skill bias 
effect in favor of skilled jobs for educated workers. Tarabusi (1997) also found a trend 
towards skill upgrading, but revealed that the effects on qualifications depend on the 
importance of the nature of technology and the context in which technological changes are 
embedded. The latter finding is in line with the management literature (see e.g. Tushman 
and Anderson, 1997; Piva et al., 2003; Chesbrough, 2003) highlighting the importance of 
the organizational context for changes in the skill composition of employment.  
This argument can be extended to R&D outsourcing at the firm level by 
investigating the impact of firms’ decisions in terms of technology sourcing (by means of 
R&D outsourcing) on the relative importance of R&D skills in total firm employment. This 
relates to the question whether, and if so, in which direction, firm level decisions in terms 
of R&D outsourcing change the relative importance of R&D labor in total employment. 
 
2.3 The importance of the type and geographical location of the contractor 
 
As technology markets evolve, the number of contractors grow and eventually become a 
specialized autonomous industry (Howells et al., 2004). Unfortunately, little attention has 
been paid to the type of contractor and their location. The selection of a certain type of 
contractor is dependent on the supply on the technology market on the one hand (Howells 
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et al., 2004), and on the nature of the R&D project or service that is outsourced on the 
other.  
Agreements with universities are formed whenever risk is not an important obstacle 
to innovation, and typically serve to share costs. These agreements are found to be 
complementary to other innovative activities such as performing internal R&D, sourcing 
public information and cooperative agreements with suppliers and customers (Veugelers 
and Cassiman, 2005). Public research organizations and private research centers are 
partners that provide basic research as well as applied R&D for direct use. The same 
applies for polytechnics and other higher education institutes. Cassiman et al. (2005) find 
that in case project knowledge has high strategic value, internal development or simple 
contracting of some specific activities is preferred. Projects contracted out to universities 
show a significantly higher strategic importance. The authors argue that both the 
governance form and the partner’s characteristics may mitigate the risk of leakage. 
Outsourcing R&D to other firms tends to happen in a more competitive market 
environment. 
Besides the type of contractor, the geographical location of the contractor also 
needs to be taken into account. The topic of geographical location is related to the aspect of 
proximity and is found to be important, especially for the decision to outsource core 
activities (Sorenson et al., 2006; Cusmano et al., 2008). The main argument put forward in 
favor of local outsourcing is that proximity facilitates (the coordination of) knowledge 
exchange and trust by enhancing personal contacts (Love and Roper, 2001) which is 
important to create stable and prolonged relationships for transferring complex knowledge 
and enhancing innovation (Hansen, 1999; Sorenson et al., 2006). Since knowledge and 
technology transfer activities are in general localized phenomena (Audretsch and Feldman, 
1986; Jaffe, 1986) the regional level is a first appropriate geographical entity to be taken 
into account.  
On the other end, the increasingly global dispersion of R&D (specialisation) creates 
a need for firms to access distant knowledge sources and to tap into global networks. This 
has been facilitated by advances in communication technologies, developments in 
management and business processes, and the increasing openess of economies (Mol, 2005). 
Also, expansion (opportunities) in different (especially emerging) markets creates the need 
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to adapt R&D to the market strategy of a given host country. In this respect R&D 
outsourcing is enabled by a large pool of ‘local’ qualified human capital. Again, the 
governance and appropriability of the knowledge provided by outsourced R&D tends to 
become more difficult with the complexity of the knowledge transferred (as put forward by 
the global value chain literature, Gereffi et al., 2005).  
Between the local and the global context in which R&D outsourcing takes place, 
institutional (including e.g. tax policy, social security) and cultural values and norms can be 
supposed to play a decisive role in the search process for contractors (Hofstede, 1991; 
Schwartz, 1999). As such, national specificities remain important. 
 
2.4 Research questions 
 
This paper contributes to the debate on R&D outsourcing in different ways. First, it 
examines the impact of firm-level decisions with regard to outsourcing of R&D on the 
internal R&D employment intensity. These firm-level decisions take qualitative values: a 
firm can start with R&D outsourcing; increase its ongoing outsourcing activities; decrease 
them; or stop outsourcing. 
Secondly, the partners to whom the activities are outsourced are differentiated by 
type (universities; (semi-) public research centers; other firms) and by geographical 
location (regional; national (but outside the firm’s region); or abroad). 
 In order to assess the impact of firms’ strategies in terms of R&D outsourcing on 
changes in the internal employment intensity of R&D workers, two research questions are 
formulated:  
 
(i) How do corporate decisions to start, increase, decrease, or stop R&D outsourcing 
influence internal R&D employment intensity?; 
 
(ii) Does the influence on the internal R&D employment intensity of corporate decisions to 
start, increase, decrease, or stop R&D outsourcing vary accross the type and geographical 
location of the contractor? 
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3. Model and data 
 
3.1 The model 
 
Taking on board the ideas put forward in the literature and based on the research questions, 
the basic model for the analysis in first differences (except for dummy variables) is as 
follows: 
1 0 1
2 2 1
2
2 3 ~N(0, )
T P C
START INCREASE
it ot t p i c ict it it
t p c
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it it it it
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    
  
 
Note: i = firm; t = year (2001; 2003 and 2005); Δ denotes first differences (e.g. ΔRDIit=RDIit - RDIit-1)
i
.  
 Dt: Year dummies; Pi: Dummies denoting the Pavitt group a firm belongs to (p=1...P: number of Pavitt 
categories); Xict: control variables (see text, c= 1...C: number of control variables).  
 
The internal R&D employment intensity (RDI) is measured as the ratio of R&D 
personnel to total employment, both measured in full time equivalents. 
 Year dummies (Dt) are included because R&D intensity tends to change over time 
depending on general economic conditions (e.g. business cycle). As the basic model is 
expressed in terms of changes over time, and as detailed information of R&D data is 
available only for the odd years (see data discription in section 3.2), three time periods can 
be considered: 1999-2001; 2001-2003 and 2003-2005. Firms’ internal R&D intensity 
clearly was on the rise at the beginning of the period under consideration (+ 1.3 percent 
point between 1999 and 2001 in terms of total business enterprise R&D personnel per 
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thousand employees in industry), sharply fell back in the period 2001-2003, and stagnated 
in the period 2003-2005 at a level close to the 1999 level (OECD, 2007). 
Suggested by the literature review, a number of potential determinants of internal 
R&D intensity have been included as control variables. First, cross-sector differences in 
technological opportunities are captured by dummies denoting the Pavitt category a given 
firm belongs to (Pi). The taxonomy proposed by Pavitt (1984) distinguished five different 
industry types for the manufacturing sector: science based, scale intensive, labor intensive, 
resource intensive and specialized suppliers. Tidd et al. (1997) extended the taxonomy to 
include the services sector, adding an information intensive group as well as specialized 
suppliers in services.  
All other control variables (Xict) are continuous and are included in first differences 
in the estimation, except for group affiliation which is classified by three dummies 
denoting whether the firm is independent, belongs to a Belgian group or to a foreign group 
respectively (based on country of origin of the ultimate controller). Average employment is 
considered for firm size. Other firm characteristics included are exports (average share of 
turnover realised outside the home country); the share of research expenditures in the total 
R&D budget (see e.g. Howells et al., 2008); the ratio of R&D that is outsourced to total 
R&D expenditures; and the share of R&D personnel in total employment at the beginning 
of the period under consideration (i.e. t-1). 
 The variables of interest in this paper are those related to firms’ decisions to start, 
increase, decrease or stop outsourcing R&D
ii
. These binary choice variables were 
multiplied by the absolute change in the ratio of outsourced R&D to total R&D. This 
allows to consider the magnitude of the changes. As highlighted before, these corporate 
 13 
decisions in R&D outsourcing will be further specified to account for the type of contractor 
and its geographical location.  
 
3.2 Data availability and description of the independent and control variables 
 
The data on Belgian firms used in this analysis are provided by the Federal Cooperation 
Commission, CFS/STAT, which gathers this information on the basis of the biannual 
OECD R&D business survey. The results of four subsequent surveys were taken into 
account: R&D survey 2000 (results for 1998 and 1999); R&D survey 2002 (results for 
2000 and 2001); R&D survey 2004 (results for 2002 and 2003); and R&D survey 2006 
(results for 2004 and 2005). Detailed information on the variable ‘outsourced R&D by type 
of contractor and geographical location’ is only available for the odd years (1999; 2001; 
2003; and 2005). Those years are used in the analysis. 
The focus of the survey are enterprises (defined at the level of the smallest legal 
entity – i.e. those having a VAT number) that perform R&D on a permanent or quasi-
permanent base. All firms that are known to perform R&D are included. An update is made 
each time a new survey is launched, taking into account both firms known from the past to 
be R&D active and a monitoring of firms declaring to be R&D active, e.g. by means of 
press releases or demand for R&D grants (for a more detailed overview see: Commission 
Coopération Fédérale, 2001). For the analysis in this paper, a permanent or quasi-
permanent R&D active firm is any firm which declared in the OECD survey: (i) at least 
one full time equivalent R&D employee in at least one year during the period 1999-2005; 
and (ii) internal R&D expenditures larger or equal to 30.000 euro in at least one year during 
the same period. 
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During the period 1999-2005 firms went bankrupt, merged, acquired (parts of) other 
firms or experienced other changes with an important impact on the evolution of R&D and 
other enterprise variables. Therefore, information on changes with an impact larger than 
10% (negative or positive) in terms of overall employment or in terms of turnover was 
asked for in each of the four surveys. In case of mergers, acquisitions or sale of a part of a 
company, information was collected on other enterprises involved in the operation and the 
different enterprises involved were taken together as one entity for the entire period. Firms 
that went bankrupt are excluded from the analysis. This way firm-level data have been 
constructed to guarantee comparability over time, resulting in a database with 1,971 
enterprises as a starting point for the analysis. There are three time cohorts: 1999-2001; 
2001-2003; and 2003-2005, and so 5,913 potential observations. Unfortunately, due to the 
voluntary nature of the survey there are a lot of missing values. More information is 
available for key variables on internal R&D activities and for R&D personnel since an 
additional short survey/telephone follow-up and other sources were used to gather these 
data. Data on the evolution of outsourced R&D expenditures was available for 1,378 
observations. However, in order to estimate the model as described in section 3.1, only 
1,161 observations for 761 enterprises could be taken into account for a model not 
differentiating between type (firms outside the group - universities - public and private 
research centers) and geographical location (regional - national - abroad) of the contractor. 
Including the latter distinction, the need for more detailed information on outsourcing R&D 
left a dataset of 553 observations for 384 enterprises. 
 
< Insert Figure 1 about here> 
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 The comparison in Table 1 of the observations (for the total of the three time 
periods) included in the analysis with the ones pertaining to the the population of (quasi-) 
permanent R&D active enterprises in Belgium but not included in the analysis, reveals a 
selection bias towards large, less export-oriented, and more R&D intensive enterprises. 
However, these firms have a lower share of outsourced R&D in the total (internal and 
outsourced) R&D budget. The findings seem to support the negative relation between 
outsourcing and firm size found by Coase (1937) but contrast the findings of Laursen and 
Salter (2006) for innovative activities. In terms of change in R&D employment intensity 
(the dependent variable in the analysis in section 4) no significant differences are found 
between both groups of observations. 
 
Table 1: Mean values of the independent and the continuous control variables for 
observations included in the analysis (basic model – see Figure 1) and those not included 
 Panel 
observations 
  
Population 
(excl. panel) 
observations 
Sig.* 
Change in R&D employment intensity (R&D 
employment/average employment) 
-0.02 (1,161) -0.03 (936) >.10 
Size (average employment) 320.89 (1,156) 171.69 (4,400) <.01 
Export (share of turnover outside the home country) 0.43 (925) 0.53 (1,441) <.01 
Research share (share of research in total R&D budget) 0.41 (871) 0.38 (1,095) <.10 
R&D intensity 0.20 (1,161) 0.17 (2,276) <.01 
Outsourced R&D (share of outsourced R&D budget in 
total – internal + outsourced – R&D budget) 
0.13 (1,161) 0.16 (1,867) <.01 
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Note: number of observations in brackets. The number of observations for some variables in the panel can be 
lower than 1,161 because the analysis in section 4 is based on a general-to-specific approach in which non-
significant variables are gradually dropped. * Significance of the difference between the averages of the two 
groups of observations based on a t-test. 
 
Comparison of the distribution of firm ownership in the selected group of 1,161 
observations (independent firms: 31.2%; firms belonging to a Belgian group: 31.3%; firms 
belonging to an international group: 37.6%) with the one for observations not included 
(respectively 39.5%; 29.1% and 31.4%) indicates that observations for firms belonging to a 
(especially international) group are overrepresented in the analysis. In terms of industrial 
activity, a comparison of the analyzed group with the group of observations not taken into 
account reveals no systematic changes for the Pavitt categories information intensive, scale 
intensive, science based, resource intensive or labour intensive. However, a big discrepancy 
exists between specialized suppliers in services and manufacturing. In the manufacturing 
sector, firms belonging to this category were largely overrepresented in the group of 
observations taken into account for the analysis (18.9% of observations in the analysed 
group versus 13.8% for those not analysed). The opposite was true in services (9.3% versus 
14.9%).  
A comparison of the 553 observations containing information on the type and 
geographical location of the contractor with the 1,161 observations included in the basic 
model revealed no significant bias in terms of the control variables presented in Table1.  
 
4. Analysis 
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4.1 Descriptive statistics on firm decisions in terms of outsourcing of R&D 
 
On average, over the period 1999-2005, a firm’s outsourced R&D budget amounts to 13.1 
% (standard deviation 0.23) of the total (internal and outsourced) R&D budget. Decisions 
to start, increase, decrease, or stop outsourcing imply absolute changes in the share of 
outsourced R&D in total R&D of respectively +0.28 (standard deviation equals 0.28); 
+0.14 (0.19); -0.18 (0.20); and -0.28 (0.25). As such, the share of outsourced R&D 
involved in starting and stopping outsourcing R&D seems of equal importance, whereas the 
change in the share in the total R&D budget is larger on average in case of a decrease than 
in case of an increase in outsourcing.  
Table 2 highlights the frequencies of the different outsourcing decisions by 
headoffice, by size class (large refers to firms with 250 or more employees; medium-sized 
to 50-249; and small to less than 50), and by industrial activity. In terms of ultimate control 
of the firm it can be noted that firms belonging to a group are relatively more frequently 
involved in sustained outsourcing and less in starting and especially stopping such 
activities. Also, less than one third of these firms were not at all engaged in outsourcing 
R&D in two consecutive time periods (1999-2001; 2001-2003; 2003-2005). Independent 
firms relatively most often take the decision to stop the outsourcing of R&D and are less 
likely to be engaged in outsourcing of R&D. 
 
Table 2: Frequency of decisions to outsource R&D broken down by head office; size and 
industrial activity  - in row percentages 
  Start  Decrease Stop Null Number of 
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Increase observations 
Head office        
Independent firm 16% 10% 11% 20% 43% 362 
Belgian group 13% 23% 19% 14% 31% 363 
International group 15% 19% 18% 15% 32% 436 
         
Size        
Large 15% 31% 23% 11% 20% 239 
Medium-sized 13% 17% 18% 16% 36% 363 
Small 16% 13% 12% 19% 39% 559 
         
Industrial activity        
Labor intensive 15% 17% 20% 20% 28% 142 
Resource intensive 12% 27% 17% 13% 31% 150 
Science based 13% 21% 22% 14% 30% 146 
Scale intensive 19% 20% 22% 16% 23% 208 
Specialized suppliers 16% 17% 13% 20% 35% 220 
Information intensive services 13% 12% 10% 10% 56% 187 
Specialized suppliers services 13% 9% 9% 27% 42% 108 
Note: The first five columns show row percentages, the last column shows the number of observations (total 
number of observations is 1,161). 
 
The propensity to increase or decrease existing R&D outsourcing increases with 
firm size. The opposite is true for decisions to start or stop outsourcing R&D. These 
findings are in line with those presented by Veugelers and Cassiman (1999) indicating that 
large resourceful firms have a higher propensity to combine internal and outsourced R&D 
than their counterparts. 
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Finally, concerning industrial activity (Pavitt taxonomy) a clear distinction can be 
made between manufacturing and services firms. Close to 40% of firms in the 
manufacturing sector are involved in sustained (increased or decreased) outsourcing of 
R&D (with specialized suppliers at the lower end) compared to half as much in the services 
sector. For information intensive services and specialized suppliers services this is the case 
only for about one fifth of the firms. The findings corroborate Laursen and Salter (2006) 
who found knowledge intensive small firms less likely to be open because they are often 
based on the exploitation of a new idea and face a larger danger of leakage of their ideas. 
Therefore, they limit the nature and scope of their external interaction. 
Table 3 presents the correlations between the different types and geographical 
locations of the R&D contractor. The results presented refer to the sample of 553 
observations included in the detailed model (see Figure 1). Before investigating the 
correlation between outsourcing decisions with certain types of contractors at certain 
geographical locations, a snapshot is given on the number of contractors involved in each 
of these decisions (start; increase; decrease; or stop) respectively by type and by 
geographical location of the contractor. An analysis at the level of the detailed model (see 
Figure 1 – 553 observations) for combined location and type of contractor revealed no 
significant differences (at 5% level) in terms of the four possible firm decisions related to 
R&D outsourcing between the observations included in the analysis and those pertaining to 
the basic model (Figure 1 – 1,161 observations). 
 Firms starting to outsource do so in 43% of the cases to another firm, in 49% of the 
cases to a university and in 35% to a research center. For increased outsourcing this 
amounts to respectively 63%; 69%; and 68%. For decreased outsourcing this amounts to 
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respectively 71%; 73%; and 55%. For stopping it is respectively 58%; 51%; and 34%. 
These data reveal that started and sustained outsourcing is relatively more likely to involve 
universities. Also, increased outsourcing occurs relatively more frequently in case of 
outsourcing to a research center, whereas stopping most often involves other firms. This 
could be explained by the fact that associations with contract research firms or other 
technical service providers generally are well-delineated contractual agreements used to 
fulfill very specific needs in a relatively short-time period. Outsourcing to universities in 
many cases is part of a firm’s long-term strategy to manage its pipeline of innovation.  
In terms of geographical distribution, to start outsourcing clearly most often 
includes regional contractors (77%), followed by foreign (24%) and national (15%) ones. 
Increased (respectively decreased) outsourcing involves 93% (94%) regional contractors, 
followed by 65% (56%) foreign and 41% (39%) national. The corresponding percentages 
for firms deciding to stop outsourcing are 82%; 37%; and 12%. 
The data presented above show that management decisions in terms of starting, 
increasing, decreasing, or stopping to outsource R&D occur at the same time with different 
types of contractors (confirming the findings by Howells et al., 2004) and at different 
locations. On average, firms starting to outsource R&D do so with 1.27 different types of 
contractors at 1.16 different locations. For increased and decreased outsourcing this 
amounts to respectively 2.01 and 2.00 types at 2.00 and 1.89 locations. In case a firm 
decides to stop R&D outsourcing, on average, 1.43 different types of contractors at 1.31 
different locations are involved. The information presented in Table 3 reveals important 
correlations between certain types of contractors at certain locations. 
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Table 3: Firms’ decisions on R&D outsourcing: Correlation between type and geographical 
location of the contractor 
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Firm - firm n.a.   red. n.a.  red. red. n.a. 
Firm - university         ++ 
Firm - center          
University - university n.a.   red. n.a.  red. red. n.a. 
University- center  +   ++ +    
Center – center n.a.  ++ red. n.a.  red. red. n.a. 
           
In
cr
e
a
se
 
Firm - firm n.a. +++ +++ red. n.a. ++ red. red. n.a. 
Firm - university   +  ++  ++   
Firm - center          
University - university n.a. +++ +++ red. n.a. +++ red. red. n.a. 
University- center   +++  +++ +++ + +++ +++ 
Center – center n.a. ++  red. n.a. +++ red. red. n.a. 
           
D
ec
re
a
se
 
Firm - firm n.a. ++ ++ red. n.a. ++ red. red. n.a. 
Firm - university     +   + + 
Firm - center   +++  +  +   
University - university n.a. ++ +++ red. n.a. +++ red. red. n.a. 
University- center    +++ +++  +++ +++ +++ 
Center – center n.a.  + red. n.a.  red. red. n.a. 
           
S
to
p
 
Firm - firm n.a.   red. n.a. +++ red. red. n.a. 
Firm - university          
Firm - center          
University - university n.a. ++  red. n.a. ++ red. red. n.a. 
University- center   ++ ++ +++ +++    
Center – center n.a.  ++ red. n.a. ++ red. red. n.a. 
Note: Correlations for the detailed model (see figure 1) with 553 observations. Correlation is statistically 
significant at 10% (+/-) , 5% (++/--), 1% (+++/---). n.a.: not applicable because no identification possible of 
contractor(s) involved. Red.: redundant with information presented  in another cell. 
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In Table 3 a distinction is made between firms’ decisions to start; increase; 
decrease; or stop R&D outsourcing. The second column gives all combinations of possible 
types of contractors and the first row does the same for possible locations of the contractor. 
The first location refers to the location of the first mentioned contractor in column 2, 
whereas the second one refers to the location of the second type of contractor mentioned in 
column 2. For example, the cell on the second row in the third column indicates the 
correlation between a firm’s decision to start outsourcing R&D to a regional firm on the 
one hand, and to a regional university on the other hand.  
For firms deciding to start outsourcing R&D, a positive correlation is found 
between regional (respectively national) universities and national research centers; between 
national universities and world research centers, and between regional and foreign research 
centers. Also, for contractors located abroad, a positive correlation is found between 
decisions to start outsourcing to firms on the one hand and to universities on the other hand. 
These correlations suggest that firms deciding to start outsourcing R&D carefully choose a 
mix of partners in function of directly applicable research (including other firms’ expertise 
or the expertise of research centers).  
For sustained outsourcing, a larger number of more significant correlations is found. 
This is not surprising given that the average number of contractors in these activities is 
higher (see before). Compared to start outsourcing R&D, firms’ decisions to increase or 
decrease R&D oustsourcing involve a combination of regional, national, and abroad 
located firms. A similar remark can be made for universities. Together with the 
involvement of research centers at different locations, this contributes to a broad mixture of 
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contractors. An important difference between the case in which a firm decides to increase 
R&D outsourcing compared to decreasing R&D outsourcing seems to be the absence of 
correlation between outsourcing to firms and outsourcing to research centers (at different 
combinations of geographical levels) in case of increased outsourcing. This could point to a 
more prominent role of the involvement of research centers at the time the decision to start 
outsourcing is taken.  
 Stopping to outsource R&D with national firms is strongly correlated with stopping 
with foreign firms. The same is true for research centers and universities (for which this 
relation also holds between the regional and the national level). Also, a high correlation 
exists between stopping outsourcing with universities on the one hand and with research 
centers on the other. 
 
4.2 Estimation 
 
The model presented in section 3.1 is estimated using pooled OLS. The reason to perform 
pooled OLS is twofold. First, all variables are considered in first differences, except for the 
dummy variables (year dummies; Pavitt categories; and group affiliation). As a 
specification in first differences is considered, time invariant firm-specific effects (fixed 
effects) are differenced out. Second, a fixed effects estimation is troublesome given the 
small number of firms for which observations for more than one year is available. 
Estimation results are reported in Table 4. As the value of the dependent variable 
ranges from –1 to +1 it was transformed to apply a logit specificationiii. Column (i) shows 
the results of the basic model of firms’ decisions on R&D outsourcing and column(ii) 
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reports the results of the detailed specification, in which the decision with respect to 
outsourcing R&D is broken down by the type of contractor and its location (i.e. both 
interacted). The two models presented are the final result of a general-to-specific approach, 
in which the most general unrestricted model is gradually simplified by dropping non-
significant variables, as long as specification tests are satisfied (see e.g. Charemza and 
Deadman, 1992). One of the advantages of a general-to-specific approach is that the 
number of observations can increase when non-significant variables for which missing 
values occur can be dropped. Moreover, the quality of the specification often improves 
considerably by dropping irrelevant variables. The non-significant variables that remain in 
the specific models could not be dropped due to the significance of Ramsey’s RESET test 
(a test of misspecification). All models include unreported year dummies that are not 
statistically significant. 
 
Table 4: R&D employment intensity and outsourcing 
Dependent variable = Change in internal R&D 
employment intensity  
(i) (ii) 
 Basic model Full model with interaction° 
   
Pavitt: Labor intensive -0.06 (0.01)*** -0.10 (0.00)*** 
Pavitt: Science based 0.11 (0.01)*** 0.11 (0.15) 
Pavitt: Information intensive services 0.05 (0.21)  
Pavitt: Resource intensive  -0.05 (0.08)* 
Exports (share of turnover outside the nation)  -0.07 (0.70) 
Share of research expenditures in total R&D expenditures  0.04 (0.40) 
R&D intensity beginning of period -0.61 (0.00)*** -0.60 (0.00)*** 
Share of outsourced R&D in total R&D budget 0.06 (0.12)  
Change in outsourced R&D – start -0.17 (0.02)**  
Other firm within the region  -0.38 (0.10)* 
 25 
Research center within the nation  -0.77 (0.06)* 
Change in outsourced R&D – increase -0.31 (0.00)***  
Other firm abroad  1.32 (0.04)** 
University abroad  1.92 (0.10)* 
Research center within the region  -0.80 (0.07)* 
Change in outsourced R&D – decrease   
University within the nation  2.26 (0.02)** 
Change in outsourced R&D – stop   
Other firm within the nation  -29.32 (0.02)** 
University within the region  0.35 (0.05)** 
Adjusted R-squared 0.18 0.19 
N 1,161 553 
Note: Standard errors are heteroskedastic-consistent; p-value in brackets; * (**): Statistically significant at 5%, (1%). ° Interaction refers 
to the interaction between type of contractor and geographical location.  
 
In the basic model (column i), the dummies denoting the Pavitt group a firm 
belongs to, indicate that labor intensive firms witnessed a significantly lower increase in 
internal R&D employment intensity relative to the reference group (specialized suppliers) 
whereas science based firms had significantly higher growth in internal R&D employment 
intensity, again compared to the reference group. Also, internal R&D employment intensity 
at the beginning of the period under consideration is statistically significant.
iv
 The negative 
sign indicates that firms with an initially high internal R&D employment intensity are - all 
other things equal - more likely to witness a larger decrease (smaller increase) in R&D 
employment intensity in the following two-year period than their counterparts. The other 
control variables do not turn out to be statistically significant
v
.  
 The decision of firms to start or to increase R&D outsourcing turns out to have a 
statistically significant negative impact on internal R&D employment intensity. No 
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significant impact on internal R&D employment is found for firms deciding to decrease or 
to stop R&D outsourcing. 
 Refining the outsourcing variables, using a breakdown of both the type of partner 
and its location (column ii) does not change the conclusions with respect to control 
variables, except for the statistical significance (10%) of the negative sign of resource 
intensive firms (Pavitt taxonomy). However, the estimation clearly shows that overall 
decisions to start, increase, decrease or stop the outsourcing of R&D conceal important 
differences between types and geographical location of the R&D contractor as to the 
impact on internal R&D employment intensity. This could be related to the different 
motives underlying the corporate decision to outsource R&D according to the type and 
geographical location of the R&D contractor and is in line with the correlations found in 
Table 3. 
The decision to start outsourcing R&D to firms within the proper region and to 
research centers in another region has a significant negative impact - though only at the 
10% level - on internal R&D employment intensity, suggesting a substitution effect.  
 The coefficients of increased outsourcing towards other firms and universities 
outside the country are significant. The positive sign now suggests a complementary 
relationship with firms’ own R&D intensity. On the other hand, the significant negative 
sign of increased R&D outsourcing towards research centers in the proper region suggests 
substitution for internal R&D employment.  
 In contrast with the lack of statistical evidence of an impact in the basic model of 
firms’ decisions to decrease or stop R&D outsourcing, taking into account the type and 
geographical location of the contractor reveals that decreasing R&D outsourcing towards 
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universities in another Belgian region and stopping to outsource to a university in the 
proper region have a statistically significant positive impact on the internal R&D 
employment intensity of firms. The opposite is true in case of firms’ decisions to cease to 
outsource R&D to other firms in another Belgian region. This decision has a significant and 
highly negative impact on internal R&D employment intensity suggesting that when 
outsourcing R&D towards these contractors stops internal R&D employment intensity 
decreases. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper explored the effects of R&D outsourcing on the R&D labor composition. Its aim 
was to assess if firms’ R&D outsourcing strategies changed in internal R&D employment 
intensity. A distinction was made between firms’ decisions to start; increase; decrease; or 
stop R&D outsourcing. Differences in the type and location of the R&D contractor have 
also been considered. 
 In terms of R&D outsourcing activities, the analysis revealed that larger firms and 
firms belonging to a group have a higher propensity to be engaged in R&D outsourcing in a 
more permanent way. Smaller firms have a relatively higher propensity to start or to stop 
R&D outsourcing. Also, management decisions in terms of starting, sustaining or stopping 
R&D outsourcing occur at the same time with different types of contractors at different 
locations. Firms’ decisions to start or to stop R&D outsourcing more frequently involve 
regional contractors, whereas sustained outsourcing relatively more frequently involves 
national and international contractors. Finally, the outcomes of the analysis pointed to a 
careful choice of a mix of different types of contractors at different geographical locations. 
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In this respect, decisions to start or to stop R&D outsourcing frequently involve both 
universities and research centers. Sustained outsourcing more often is a mixture of both 
public and private contractors. 
 In terms of the effects of decisions related to the outsourcing of R&D, started or 
increased outsourcing – at least in the short run – has a significant negative effect on the 
internal R&D employment intensity, pointing to a change in labor composition. No 
significant impact is found in case a firm decides to decrease or to stop R&D outsourcing. 
This indicates that decreases in internal R&D employment intensity related to started and 
increased R&D outsourcing are not turned around at the time outsourcing stops or 
decreases. However, these decisions conceal marked differences between types and 
geographical locations of the R&D contractor. Increased outsourcing towards other firms 
and universities outside the country affects internal R&D employment intensity in a 
significant positive way. The opposite is true in case of outsourcing towards research 
centers in the proper region. 
 These findings are not without policy relevance. The finding that starting or 
increasing R&D outsourcing negatively affects the internal R&D employment intensity 
could stir fear of hollowing out the local knowledge base. This fear however seems to be 
unjustified as these negative findings seem to be mainly related to the outsourcing of – 
more applied – R&D towards local research centers and there actually seem to be positive 
effects of increased R&D outsourcing towards other firms and universities outside the 
country, suggesting the existence of positive international spillovers. 
Finally, given a number of (data) limitations of the present analysis, the results 
presented in this paper should be considered with some caution. First, the analysis is based 
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on a panel of (quasi-)permanent R&D active firms in Belgium for the period 1999-2005. It 
cannot be excluded that the analytical outcomes are somewhat biased towards large firms; 
research intensive firms active in the specialized suppliers manufacturing industry; and 
firms belonging to an international group. 
Second, no data are available on the determinants of outsourcing and concerns of 
appropriability which are very likely to interact with the decision to start; increase; 
decrease; or stop outsourcing and its impact on internal R&D employment. 
Finally, due to a lack of information, the type of R&D activities outsourced (e.g. 
basic or applied research, product or process development) or the continuance of 
outsourcing to the same entity could not be taken into account in the analysis. 
 
 
6. References 
Antras, P. (2005), ‘Incomplete Contracts and the Product Cycle’, American Economic 
Review, 95, 1054-1073. 
Arrow, K. (1962), ‘Economic welfare and the allocation of resources for invention’, in: R. 
Nelson (Ed.), The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity, Princeton University Press: 
Princeton. 
Audretsch, D., Feldman, M. (1986), ‘R&D Spillovers and the Geography of Innovation and 
Production’, American Economic Review, 86, 630-640.  
Audretsch, D., Menkveld, A., Thurik, R. (1996), ‘The decision between internal and 
external R&D’, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 152, 519-530. 
 30 
Belderbos, R., Carree, M., Diederen, B., Lokshin, B., Veugelers, R. (2004), ‘Heterogeneity 
in R&D cooperation strategies’, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 22, 
1237-1263. 
Beneito, P. (2006), ‘The innovative performance of in-house and contracted R&D in terms 
of patents and utility models’, Research Policy, 35, 502–517. 
Bönte, W. (2003), ‘R&D and productivity: internal vs. external R&D – evidence from West 
German manufacturing industries’, Economics of Innovation and New Technology, 12, 
343-360. 
Brusoni, S. Prencipe, A., Pavitt, K. (2001), ‘Knowledge specialization, organizational 
coupling, and boundaries of the firm: why do firms know more than they make?’, 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 46, 597-621. 
Cassiman, B., Di Guardo, C., Valentini, G. (2005). ‘Organizing for Innovation: R&D 
Projects, Activities and Partners’, IESE Business School Working Paper No. 597. 
Cassiman, B., Veugelers, R. (2006), ‘In search of complementarity in innovation strategy: 
Internal R&D, cooperation in R&D and external technology acquisition’, Management 
Science, 52, 68-82. 
Charemza, W.W., D.F. Deadman, D.F. (1997), New Directions in Econometric Practice: 
General to Specific Modelling, Cointegration and Vector Autoregression.(Second 
Edition) Edward Elgar: Cheltenham. 
Chesbrough, H. (2003), Open Innovation: The New Imperative for Creating and Profiting 
from Technology, Harvard Business School Press, Boston, Massachusetts. 
Cohen, W., Levinthal, D. (1990), ‘Absorptive capacity: a new perspective of innovation 
and learning’, Administrative Science Quarterly, 35, 128-152. 
 31 
Commission Coopération fédérale, Groupe de concertation, Groupe ad hoc Profit (2001), 
Méthodologie pour l’estimation de l’effort de R&D des entreprises. Rapport interne 
SSTC: Brussels. 
Coombs, R. (1996), ‘Core competencies and the strategic management of R&D’, R&D 
Management, 25, 345-355. 
Coombs, R., Harvey, M., Metcalfe, S. (2003), ‘Analysing distributed processes of 
provision and innovation’, Industrial and Corporate Change, 12, 1125-1155. 
Cusmano L., Luisa, M., Morrison, A. (2008), ‘Innovation and the geographical and 
functional dimensions of outsourcing: An empirical investigation based on Italian firm 
level data’, Papers in Evolutionary Economic Geography, 2008 n°6, Utrecht 
University, Section of Economic Geography. 
Davidson, W., McFetridge, D. (1984), ‘International Technology Transactions and the 
Theory of the Firm’, Journal of Industrial Economics, 32, 253-264. 
Edler, J., Meyer-Krahmer, F., Reger, G. (2002), ‘Changes in the strategic management of 
technology: results of a global benchmarking study’, R&D Management, 32, 149–164. 
Gereffi, G, Humphrey, J., Sturgeon, T. (2005), ‘The governance of global value chains’, 
Review of International Political Economy, 12(1), 78–104. 
Gilley, K. and Rasheed, A. (2000), ‘Making More by Doing Less: An Analysis of 
Outsourcing and its Effects on Firm Performance’, Journal of Management,  26 (4), 
763–790. 
Granstrand, O., Bohlin, E., Oskarson, C., Sjöberg, N. (1992), ‘External technology 
acquisition in large multitechnology corporations’, R&D Management, 22, 111-113. 
 32 
Griffith, R., Redding, S., Van Reenen, J. (2004), ‘Mapping The Two Faces Of R&D: 
Productivity Growth In A Panel Of OECD Industries’, Review of Economics and 
Statistics, 86, 883-895. 
Hamel, G., Doz, Y., and Prahalad, C. (1989) ‘Collaborate with Your Competitors and 
Win’, Harvard Business Review, 67, 133-139.  
Hofstede, G. (1991), Cultures and organizations: Software of the mind. McGraw-Hill: 
Berkshire. 
Holmström, B., Milgrom, P. (1994), ‘The Firm as an Incentive System’, American 
Economic Review, 84, 972-991. 
Howells, J., Gagliardi, D., Malik, K. (2008), ‘The growth and management of R&D 
outsourcing: evidence from UK pharmaceuticals’, R&D Management, 38, 205-219. 
Howells, J., James, A., Malik, K. (2004), ‘Sourcing external technological knowledge: a 
decision support framework for firms’, International Journal of Technology 
Management, 27, 143-155. 
Jacobides, M., Billinger, S., (2006), ‘Designing the boundaries of the firm: From "make, buy or 
ally" to the dynamic benefits of vertical architecture’, Organization Science, 17 (2), 249-261. 
Jaffe, A. (1986), ‘Technological Opportunity and Spillovers of R&D: Evidence from Firms' 
Patents, Profits and Market Value’, American Economic Review, 76, 984-1001. 
Kahn, S. (2000), The bottom-line impact of nonstandard jobs on companies’ profitability 
and productivity, in F. Carré, M. A. Ferber, L. Golden, and S. A. Herzenberg (Eds.), 
Nonstandard work: The nature and challenges of changing employment relations (pp. 
235-265). Urbana-Champaign: University of Illinois. 
 33 
 Klevorick, A., Levin, R., Nelson, R., Winter, S. (1995), ‘On the sources and significance 
of interindustry differences in technological opportunities’, Research Policy, 24, 185-
205. 
Kogut, B., Zander, U. (1993), ‘Knowledge of the firm and the evolutionary theory of the 
multinational corporation’, Journal of International Business Studies, 24, 625-645. 
Laursen, K., Salter, A. (2006), ‘Open for Innovation: The role of openness in explaining 
innovative performance among UK manufacturing firms’, Strategic Management 
Journal, 27, 131-150. 
Love J.H. and S. Roper 2001, Outsourcing in the innovation process: Locational and 
strategic determinants, Papers in Regional Science, 80 (3), 317-336. 
Mansfield, E., Romeo, A. (1980), ‘Technology Transfer to Overseas Subsidiaries by U.S.-
Based Firms’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 95, 737-750. 
Mehta, S. and Peters, L. (2007), ‘Outsourcing a Core Competency’, Research and 
Technology Management, 50(3), 26-34. 
Mol M.J. 2005, ‘Does being R&D intensive still discourage outsourcing? Evidence from 
Dutch manufacturing’, Research Policy, 34, 571-582. 
Narula, R. (2001), ‘Choosing between internal and non-internal R&D activities: some 
technological and economic factors’, Technology Analysis and Strategic Management, 
13, 365-387. 
OECD (2002), The measurement of scientific and technological activities: Frascati 
manual: proposed standard practice for surveys on research and experimental 
development. OECD: Paris. 
OECD (2007), Main Science and Technology Indicators. OECD: Paris. 
 34 
Pavitt, K. (1984), ‘Sectoral patterns of technological change: towards a taxonomy and a 
theory’, Research Policy, 13, 343-373. 
Pianta, M. (2004), ‘The impact of innovation on jobs, skills and wages’, Economia e 
Lavoro, 1, 7-26. 
Piga, C., Vivarelli, M. (2004), ‘Internal and external R&D: a sample selection approach’, 
Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 66, 457-482. 
Pisano, G. (1990), ‘The R&D boundaries of the firm: an empirical analysis’, Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 35, 153–176. 
Piva, M., Santarelli, E., and Vivarelli, M. (2003), ‘The Skill Bias Effect of Technological 
and Organisational Change: Evidence and Policy Implications’, IZA Discussion Papers 
934, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). 
Quinn, J.B. (2000), ‘Outsourcing Innovation: the New Engine of Growth’, Sloan 
Management Review, 41, 13-28. 
Quinn, J.B. and Hilmer F.G. (1995), ‘Make versus buy: strategic outsourcing’, McKinsey 
Quarterly, 1, 48–70. 
Rosenberg, N. (1990), ‘Why Do Firms Do Basic Research (with Their Own Money)?’, 
Research Policy, 19, 165-174. 
Schwartz, S. (1999), ‘A Theory of Cultural Values and Some Implications for Work’, 
Applied Psychology: An International Review, 48, 23-47. 
Sorenson, O., Rivkin J.W. and L. Fleming, 2006, ‘Complexity, networks and knowledge 
flow’, Research Policy, 35, 994–1017. 
Swan, K. and Allred, B. (2003), ‘A product and process model of the technology-sourcing 
decision’, Journal for Product and Innovation Management, 20(6), 485–497. 
 35 
Tarabusi, C., (1997), ‘Technology and Employment: the Role of Organisational Change 
and Learning’, STI Review 20, OECD, Paris. 
Teece, D. (1986), ‘Profiting from technological innovation: implications for integration, 
collaboration, licensing and public policy’, Research Policy,  15(6), 285-305.  
Teece, D.J., Pisano, G. and Shuen, A. (1997), Dynamic capabilities and strategic 
management’, Strategic Management Journal 18 (7), 509-533. 
Teirlinck, P., Spithoven, A. (2008), ‘The spatial organization of innovation: open 
innovation, external knowledge relations and urban structure’, Regional Studies, 42, 
689-704. 
Tether, B. (2002), ‘Who co-operates for innovation, and why. An empirical analysis’, 
Research Policy, 31, 947-967. 
Tidd, J., Bessant, J., Pavitt, K. (1997), Integrating Technological, Market and 
Organisational Change. John Wiley and Sons Ltd.: Chichester. 
Tiwana, A., Keil, M. (2007), ‘Does Peripheral Knowledge Complement Control? An 
Empricial Test in Technology Outsourcing Alliances’, Strategic Management Journal, 
28, 623-634. 
Trefler, D. (2005), ‘Offshoring: threats and opportunities’, in: S. Collins, L. Brainard (Eds), 
Offshoring White-Collar Work-The Issues and the Implications. Brookings Institution 
Press, New York . 
Tushman, M. and Anderson, Ph. (1997), Managing Strategic Innovation and Change: A 
Collection of Readings, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Veugelers, R., Cassiman, B. (1999), ‘Make and buy in innovation strategies: evidence from 
Belgian manufacturing firms’, Research Policy, 28, 63-80. 
 36 
Veugelers, R., Cassiman, B. (2005), ‘R&D cooperation between firms and universities. 
Some empirical evidence from Belgian manufacturing’, International Journal of 
Industrial Organization, 23, 355-379. 
von Hippel, E. (1988), The Sources of Innovation. Oxford University Press: New York.  
Williamson O. E. (1985), The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, Free Press, New York.  
Williamson, O. (1975), Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications.  
Free Press: New York. 
Wilson, R. (1977), ‘The Effects of Technological Environment and Product Rivalry on 
R&D Efforts and Licensing of Inventions’, Review of Economics and Statistics, 59, 
171-78. 
Wuyts, S., Colombo, M.G., Dutta, S., Nooteboom, B. (2005), ‘Empirical tests of optimal 
cognitive distance’, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 58, 277-302.  
 
                                                 
i
 Data on R&D outsourcing is only available for odd years. Therefore, first differences consider the difference 
of a variable for a given year and its value two years before. 
ii
 Starti,t = 1 if (Outsourced R&Di,t-1 = 0) and (Outsourced R&Di,t > 0); Increasei,t = 1 if 0 < Outsourced 
R&Di,t-1 < Outsourced R&Di,t; Decreasei,t = 1 if Outsourced R&Di,t-1 > Outsourced R&Di,t > 0; Stopi,t = 1 if 
(Outsourced R&Di,t-1 = 1) and (Outsourced R&Di,t = 0) ; Nulli,t = 1 if (Outsourced R&Di,t-1 = 0) and 
(Outsourced R&Di,t = 0). 
iii
 Estimation with the dependent variable not transformed, provides similar results and does not change the 
main conclusions. 
iv
 The inclusion of a lagged dependent variable could bias the results if the error term is subject to 
autocorrelation. Unfortunately the number of firms for which data for consecutive periods are available is 
very small. Panel AR1 estimation, which considers the potential bias, therefore can only be applied to a small 
number of firms. Moreover, this estimation has too few degrees of freedom to consider firm-specific fixed 
 37 
                                                                                                                                                    
effects, which the F-test and Hausman test reveal to be significant. The results of panel AR1 estimation, 
which are not reported but available upon request, do not appear to be very reliable. 
v
 A specification with the control variables in levels (measured at the beginning of the period) provides 
similar results as a specification with the control variables in first differences and does not change the 
conclusions with respect to the outsourcing variables. The level of average employment has a statistically 
significant negative sign and the ratio of external to total R&D has a statistically significant positive sign. 
Including a quadratic term of the latter variable supports the view of Lokshin et al. (2007) that there is an 
optimal level of the ratio of external versus internal R&D. However, Ramsey’s RESET test for the 
specification with the control variables in levels is highly significant which calls for caution in interpreting 
these results. 
